A new security system is forming in the Sahel region as a result of Paris’s waning influence, posing both challenges and opportunities.
The new government in Niger declined to work with France following the military takeover. Meanwhile, since August, there has been renewed violence in the north of Mali between Tuareg separatist groups, commonly referred to as the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), and the country’s government forces (FAMA).
The Sahel region, encompassing three borders (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso), is experiencing heightened attacks by terrorist groups, which constitute the third force. These events are occurring against this backdrop. With everything going on, one could wonder, what’s going on in the Sahel? What direction will it all go?
The history of the situation in Mali
The United States, France, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the European Union, Algeria, the UN Multidisciplinary Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the African Union have all supported the peace agreement that was mediated by Algeria in 2015. The agreements were intended to put an end to the armed war that broke out in Mali in 2012 when Islamists and movements primarily made up of Tuaregs banded together to declare independence for Azawad, a historically significant area in the country’s north.
However, not both parties have followed through on the arrangements, which were primarily promoted by international mediators. Only 3,000 of the 80,000 fighters who were part of the factions that signed the accords and were meant to join Mali’s armed forces were integrated, and the rebel groups in the north were never disarmed.
In addition, the Algiers Accord essentially created zones of control inside the nation. The Kidal region in the northeast, which is a portion of Timbuktu and Gao, has been ruled by Tuareg movements for the whole duration. The government’s presence in the area was primarily limited to coordinated operations with French forces against terrorists, rather than an active presence.
Since 2013, French forces have been leading Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorism initiative, in Mali at the request of the Malian government. The multilateral Takuba effort was also present in Mali, along with a contingent of UN peacekeepers (MINUSMA). These missions supported French interests despite their international nature because they were primarily grounded in the French understanding of security issues.
As the French Army failed to handle the issue of security in the nation and terrorist attacks mounted, Malians and independent observers began to criticise France’s presence more and more. Mali has charged France in recent years of aiding the separatists, highlighting Paris’s refusal to give Bamako direct military backing in the fight against them.
Interestingly, Nicolas Norman, a former French ambassador to Mali from 2002 to 2006, also acknowledged the fallacies of the French strategy to the Sahel in 2019. He said, “The problem was that France then thought it could distinguish between good and bad armed groups.” Some were thought to be terrorists, while others were seen as politicians. The Ifoghas were a distinct tribe that was a minority among the Tuaregs itself, and they were the Tuareg separatists who the French troops set out to find. We pursued this group and turned over the town of Kidal to them. Subsequently, the Algiers accords emerged, placing these separatists in a position of comparative advantage with the government. This is a serious error. This all maintained the possibility of further destabilising Mali.
READ ALSO: UN Peacekeepers Evacuate Northern Mali’s Strategic Camp
fresh dispute with the Tuaregs
Colonel Assimi Goita’s military takeover of Mali in May 2021 upset the established order in both the nation and the surrounding area. That same year, the new leadership, unsatisfied with the standard of French military support, turned its attention to military collaboration with Russia. Mali’s French troops were compelled to withdraw.
Old combat lines in Mali have reopened since the French troops left the country in August 2022 and the MINUSMA withdrawal process was started, which is scheduled to be finished in December 2023 (in response to a request from Bamako authorities for the mission to terminate). While the CMA wishes to hold onto power in the north, Mali’s central authorities are no longer prepared to compromise and are attempting to retake total control of the entire nation.
Control of the military installations that MINUSMA left behind has led to a more intensive phase of the fighting. The ceasefire agreement from 2014, which was reached under the stipulation that the forces hold their present positions, is the source of the contradictions. CMA therefore views as a breach of the ceasefire any moves by the Malian Armed Forces to take over bases abandoned by UN forces in Tuareg-controlled areas. On the other hand, the Malian side feels that MINUSMA is acting in accordance with French objectives in order to transfer armaments to local rebels in order to maintain a destabilising impact, and that this is evidenced by its attempts to withdraw from bases in the north of Mali before the deadline (the Malian armed forces).
As a result, early in August, when the Malian army took over a military base close to the village of Ber, it sparked fighting with CMA. The central authorities took control of the Ber, and there were more and more armed skirmishes between the parties.
Following fierce fighting in early September in the area of Burem, the Tuaregs proclaimed a “time of war” against the Bamako government. While attacking multiple Malian Army posts (Bourem, Lere, Diuri, and Bamba) in the autumn, Tuareg forces were never able to take total control of them. The vital town of Anefif was seized by government forces nearly without resistance, paving the way for the Tuareg insurgent strongholds of Kidal, Aguelhok, and Tessalit. Despite MINUSMA’s swift withdrawal, the FAMA seized control of the Tessalit military camp in late October. MINUSMA evacuated Kidal, the Tuareg-held military base, on October 31, one day ahead of schedule.
Regarding the current uptick in violence in Mali, French Minister of the Armed Forces Sebastien Lecornu stated, “The real news from now on in the Sahel will be the massive resurgence of the terrorist risk.” enormous. This implies that we can find ourselves in a scenario where Mali is divided in the upcoming days, weeks, or months. Such remarks are obviously viewed very adversely in Bamako, where they are seen as proof that Paris has a direct effect on events.
Growing threat of terrorism
A string of military takeovers in the Sahel (Mali in 2020 and 2021, two in Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023) in recent years have elevated military officers who were unhappy with security issues and harboured anti-French sentiments to positions of authority. As a result, the Burkina Faso government demanded in early 2023 that Paris remove its troops from their area, following Mali’s lead. All of this weakened France’s interests in the region and eroded its long-standing dominance.
The most recent instance of this pattern occurred in Niger, where the government, which was overthrown by a military coup that Paris denounced, asked that the French envoy be removed from office and described him as persona non grata. Early in October, France began the process of removing its troops from Niger, despite a two-month political impasse and the danger of an ECOWAS invasion.
Notably, American interests were unaffected by the events in Niger and the French loss of control. Washington was able to keep its military presence in the nation because it adopted a neutral stance by initiating diplomatic measures and refrained from denouncing the military coup.
READ ALSO: Niger military stationed troops near the border with Benin to prevent an ECOWAS invasion
In the area, other establishments that were constructed around France are still collapsing. Since 2014, the Sahel has been under the leadership of the Group of Five (G-5)—Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad. The G-5 is supported by Paris. Although it never gained traction in the region, the format attempted to coordinate efforts to counter the terrorist threat.
The first state to formally declare its exit from the G-5, effectively severing the group’s territorial connectedness, was Mali in May 2022. The G-5’s activities came to an end when Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger ended their military cooperation with France and French forces left these nations. Only two states—Mauritania and Chad—located at the eastern and western “poles” of the region, were still prepared to work with France.
Security risks in these nations are only getting worse despite the removal of French rule. A faction of Tuareg in Niger that opposed the military takeover declared the formation of a Council of Resistance for the Republic in an attempt to reinstate the deposed president. However, no real steps have been done thus far. The battle between the Tuaregs and the central government of Mali has taken Mali’s forces away from combating terrorism, but jihadist groups are still active in the country. JNIM, the local branch of al-Qaeda, is encircling Timbuktu, the country’s most significant city, and attacking both civilian targets and military installations of the Malian army. As early as April 2023, “Wilayat Sahel,” the local branch of the Islamic State, took control of large areas in the Menaka region of eastern Mali (the Three Borders area), causing a significant migration of refugees from the area. The group is still active in the country.
In other Sahelian states, radical terrorist groups have also become more active. Significantly lethal strikes have taken place in Niger close to the Mali border in recent months, and there have also been army attacks in northwest Burkina Faso, where the local IS branch still maintains control over a large portion of that nation’s northern territory.
The challenge to the military regimes combined with this circumstance compels the authorities to look for new forms of cooperation. The alliance of states of the Sahel was formed on September 16, 2018, when the governments of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which is the name of the Three Borders region.
It was especially crucial for the agreement to include a collective defence mechanism in the event of an attack on one of its members, which strengthened the power of the military regimes, since the alliance was formed in the midst of the Malian government’s conflict with rebels and the threat of an ECOWAS invasion in Niger.
It is also noteworthy that the deal was signed the day following a visit to Bamako by a delegation from the Russian Defence Ministry, which may indicate that first talks with Moscow were conducted. Members of the alliance have already declared coordinated actions against terrorist organisations along the three borders in the brief time since the alliance’s founding.
READ ALSO: AFP reports that Niger has turned to China for the construction of Africa’s longest oil pipeline
What to anticipate
The Sahelian regional security framework is undergoing substantial transformation. Even though it is waning, Paris can still have an impact on local administrations thanks to its long-standing domination, which is supported by a sizable military presence and coordinated international operations. Problems in the region are still not resolved by the disintegration of earlier collaboration models. The Sahel still faces many difficult issues, such as internal strife, the threat of jihad, and conflict. As a result, the states in the region are in a precarious position and are looking for outside allies who would assist them in managing these difficulties.
The Sahel is starting to see the emergence of a new security system that offers competing prospects for external intervention by both non-regional (Russia, Turkey) and regional (e.g., Algeria) powers. The new security system will also be heavily influenced by the success (or failure) of the new regional alliance, which already indicates how subjective the states in the region are.
The Sahelian central authorities continue to lack exclusive authority to employ force. As a result, issues with legitimacy and power transfers are becoming more intense, leading to violent conflicts over resources and influence retention (as the Tuareg crisis in northern Mali demonstrates). The Sahel states need to devise a strategy to deal with the escalating security risks and expanding conflict zones that will accompany this transition era.
Thus, the ongoing violence in Mali has particular significance. It is anticipated that the Bamako authorities would continue their campaign in the north, taking advantage of their air superiority, in an effort to crush the Tuaregs’ armed resistance. But since Tuareg dominance began in 2013, the fight over military bases and towns will be more intense. Given that it will have a significant impact on the power dynamics in Mali and the surrounding area in the years to come, it might be appealing to both sides’ regional allies.
By Andrei Shelkovnikov, expert of the Center for African Studies, HSE University
