St. Petersburg was purposefully chosen to host the Russia-Africa conference last week. It was an act of symbolism.
The meeting between Russia and Africa last week in St. Petersburg was a turning point in Moscow’s conception and execution of foreign policy. Not really, considering how many African leaders and high-ranking officials it brought to the nation. There were even more African heads of state at the first summit, held in Sochi four years earlier. Additionally, it is not just because its aim went beyond economics and incorporated a humanitarian component; while this is significant, it is not the only reason.
The meeting essentially demonstrates a paradigm shift in Moscow’s worldview and international positioning towards the world’s rising non-Western majority, as laid out in the recently adopted Foreign Policy Concept, as evidenced by the bureaucratic preparation and extensive public coverage it has received within Russia.
Peter the Great established St. Petersburg at the beginning of the 18th century as a “window to Europe,” and last week it played the same function for Africa.
Of course, the ideas and goals of the Russian elite continue to be heavily influenced by eurocentrism. However, Russia’s protracted struggle with Western integration after the fall of the Soviet Union has now erupted into a proxy war in Ukraine against the United States and NATO. Because of this, Moscow’s policies have undergone a historic transition that is comparable to those of Peter the Great, but it is headed in a completely different path. The world of Russian foreign policy will likely stay split in two for the foreseeable future: the house of allies overseas and the house of enemies, which includes Europe, North America, and the rest of the Anglosphere. The difference between the two is how a nation feels about the sanctions against Russia.
Africa is mainly on the right side of the divide in this sense. In St. Petersburg, 49 of the continent’s 54 countries were represented. True, only 17 of them took part in the top level of competition. The West this time made a serious effort, advising, cajoling, or scaring African leaders against travelling to Russia and dealing with President Putin directly, unlike during the Sochi summit four years ago. In fact, despite some success (the number of influential figures in St. Petersburg was roughly half that of Sochi), Western pressure failed to undermine the event. The level of engagement made up for the loss in representational status. It was stunning and noteworthy how much time Vladimir Putin personally devoted to the event, which really lasted three days rather than just two.
The Kremlin went above and beyond the customary verbal rebuttal to address Western accusations that Russia is to blame for the rise in food prices as a result of Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain agreement (while conveniently ignoring the fact that Moscow was given promises to end the Western blockade of Russia’s agricultural exports that were never kept). Putin announced plans to increase commercial shipping, develop logistics by sea and air linking Russia to Africa, establish a hub for Russian trade in Africa, and increase Russia’s share of food imports from Africa at the summit in addition to promising to provide grain gratis to five of Africa’s poorest countries. Moscow plans to significantly increase the Russian media’s presence on the continent as a response to Western propaganda. The idea is that Russians and Africans should be able to communicate directly with one another rather than through unreliable middlemen in London, Paris, or New York.
Certainly has its work cut out for them in Russia. After giving up on the rich heritage of the Soviet Union in Africa in the early 1990s, Moscow now faces fierce competition there. Russia’s commerce with Africa is meagre ($18 billion) in comparison to China’s ($280 billion) or America’s ($60 billion) trade. Moscow, however, is capable of far better. The summit in St. Petersburg concentrated on a number of topics, including nuclear energy, security aid, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. The importance of IT and education cannot be overstated. The Lumumba University in Moscow has served as a model for educating African professionals in Russia since the early 1960s. The school’s appeal significantly diminished after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, this is now changing, with the number of scholarships for African students to study in Russia being tripled and several Russian universities being urged to look for partners in Africa for cooperative projects.
In recent years, Russia has made significant strides towards opening up its vast region to the Internet and making Moscow one of the most technologically advanced cities in the world in terms of public Wi-Fi availability. This experience is undoubtedly worth sharing.
Russian interest in Africa has returned, but it is strategic rather than tactical. It extends far beyond the significant but everyday concerns of international trade, security, and technical cooperation. It also goes beyond the conflict in Ukraine, which predictably also came up in St. Petersburg, allowing Putin to defend his actions and give out his ideas on the terms of a peaceful settlement. In a more strategic sense, Russian strategists increasingly see Africa as part of the wave that will help replace the existing Western-dominated international order with a more diverse framework based on a variety of civilizations, along with Asia and Latin America.
Some Russians assert that they have acquaintances on the continent of Africa. Regarding the general consensus, this is mostly true. In fact, Russia remains untarnished by colonial and neo-colonial exploitation of the continent, in contrast to Western nations. It actually gave military backing to a number of national liberation movements in the 20th century and helped several of Africa’s newly independent republics economically by funding infrastructure projects. Thousands of doctors, engineers, and teachers were trained there, but the political situation is more complicated than that. The US, former colonial powers France, Britain, and other nations—not to mention Germany—see the continent primarily as their market and resource base and will work to maintain their political clout and economic hegemony. They will try to make it as difficult as they can for Russia to advance in Africa.
Moscow should resist the urge to compete with other nations for spheres of influence in the face of this opposition. It must be directed by both its desire for a new, more just, non-Western-dominated world order as well as by its national interest, which is to increase all-around cooperation with African partners. Despite all the challenges and difficulties it faced on the way to St. Petersburg, the second Russia-Africa summit was a success. The paradigm shift in Russian thinking and behaviour towards Africa, which is transforming hitherto “exotic” states into common and beneficial allies, is more significant.
